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Abstract
Prospect Theory is a widely accepted descriptive framework to model
decisions under risk. However, it is limited to situations with finitely many
outcomes. Moreover, it is discontinuous, i.e., small changes in a lottery can
produce large differences in its utility, contrary to experiments. In this article
we present two slight modifications to Prospect Theory which can be theo-
retically well justified and solve these two problems. We derive in this way a
simple model of Prospect Theory for continuous probability distributions that
captures all the essential properties of Prospect Theory. Unlike Cumulative
Prospect Theory this model has order-independent probability weighting.
Keywords: Prospect Theory, Cumulative Prospect Theory, continuity, probability
weighting.
JEL classification number: D81.
1 Introduction
1.1 Prospect Theory
Since Kahneman and Tversky [7] proposed Prospect Theory in 1979, it has accom-
modated increasing empirical evidence (see, for instance, the review by Starmer
[11]), especially when compared with classical Expected Utility Theory, which
requires too strict assumptions regarding rationality from the decision makers.
Prospect theory adopts the basic framework from Expected Utility Theory, but
with additional psychological components based on the observations of the deci-
sion making process of real people.
Prospect theory (PT) assumes that decision makers frame outcomes in terms of
gains and losses, instead of the final wealth level that is used in expected utility
theory (EU). Accordingly, the value function is composed of two part, a concave
part in the gain domain and a convex part in the loss domain, capturing the risk-
averse tendency for gains and risk-seeking tendency for losses by many decision
makers. Another important aspect is that probabilities are weighted by an S-shaped
probability weighting function (compare Fig. 1), which is based on the observa-
tion that most people tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large
probabilities.
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These additional components allow PT to explain violations of some of the proper-
ties found in EU (e.g., transitivity and the independence theorem), which have been
frequently reported from experiments. However, PT is also criticised for having
some undesirable characteristics, especially, the violation of first-order stochastic
dominance and continuity. Another limitation of PT is that it can only be applied
to discrete outcomes, but applications, e.g. in finance, require a theory for lotteries
with non-discrete outcome distributions. To solve these problems, a new theory,
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) was proposed in [13], where the cumulative
probability distributions rather than the probabilities themselves are transformed
by the probability weighting function.
Although CPT is often considered as an improvement over PT because it does not
violate stochastic dominance and it can be applied to continuous outcomes, the
empirical comparisons of these two theories are still inconclusive: some data fit
better with PT [3, 15], some data fit better with CPT [4].
Moreover, the studies that aimed at testing the key characteristics of the two theo-
ries even seem to suggest frequent contradictions with CPT. Various studies have
reported systematic violations of properties of CPT such as ordinal independence,
branch independence and event splitting effects [14, 2, 1, 6, 8, 12].
In one recent study using a critical test it has been found that the choices for gam-
bles without a certainty effect are consistent with PT, but not CPT, whereas the
choices for gambles with a certainty effect are consistent with both PT and CPT
[16] .
Given the above evidence, it seems that CPT may be descriptively not as strong
as PT. However, PT has some major disadvantages: it does not satisfy first-order
stochastic dominance and is also not continuous, and there is no generalization of
PT to non-discrete outcome distributions.
We will continue our comparison of PT and CPT at the end of this paper. Before
that, we demonstrate in Section 2 that it is possible to extend PT to non-discrete
outcome distributions. To this aim, we propose a slight modification of PT, Nor-
malized Prospect Theory (NPT), which enables us to generalize PT to continuous
distributions without changing the key features of PT.
In Section 3 we include the concept of the “editing phase” of Kahneman and Tver-
sky [7] into our theory and arrive at a modification of PT that is continuous, and
tends to be more compatible with first-order stochastic dominance. We show that
this Smooth Prospect Theory (SPT) when normalized leads in the limit to the same
generalization for non-discrete distributions as NPT.
In the concluding section we summarize the results of our work and compare the
properties of the different theories. In particular, a comparison of NPT with the
original experimental data by Kahneman and Tversky demonstrates the descriptive
validity of our approach.
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In the following sections we need a couple of basic mathematical concepts that we
briefly refresh in this introduction:
Let N ∈ N. We recall that a probability measure p on RN is a non-negative measure
with ||p|| := ∫
RN
dp = 1. A probability measure is absolutely continuous if there
exists an integrable function pa such that we can write∫
RN
f (x)dp(x) =
∫
RN
f (x)pa(x)dx
for every continuous function f . A Dirac δx0 is defined by
∫
RN
f (x)δx0(x) = f (x0)
for every continuous function f . In particular, we can write any probability distri-
bution pwith only finitely many outcomes x1, . . . xn of corresponding probabilities
p1, . . . , pn as a sum of Diracs
p =
n∑
i=1
piδxi .
(We will refer to such sums of Diracs simply as “Dirac measures”.) This formu-
lation enables us to handle the two typical situations of discrete lotteries (finitely
many outcomes) and continuous outcome distributions (e.g., normally distributed
outcomes) simultaneously.
Of course, a probability measure may also be a sum of an absolutely continuous
measure and Dirac measures, in other words it might have discrete and continuous
parts.
A central tool of this article is the approximation of measures by other measures.
To be able to approximate measures, we need to have a notion of convergence. In
other words: we want to define when an outcome distribution p is approximated by
a sequence of outcome distributions (pn)n∈N. In order to motivate the mathematical
definition, let us consider first the naive approach: we define an approximation by
requiring that pn(x) converges to p(x), i.e. that the probability of every outcome
converges. This seemingly natural approach fails for two reasons: first, we are
dealing with probability measures for which it is difficult to define p(x) in a rea-
sonable way. (p is not simply a function.) Second, we would exclude that pn = δ1/n
approximates p = δ0 which is also not what we want.
There are two better approaches: We could say that pn converges to p if every
expected utility of pn converges to the expected utility of p. This would imply
that, in the limit, no rational investor would see a difference between p and pn.
The other approach is to consider the total probability for an outcome between two
arbitrary values x1 and x2 (where x1 < x2). If the total probability for pn converges
(for every choice of x1, x2) to the total probability for p, then we could also agree
that pn converges to p.
Both approaches can (under reasonable assumptions) be unified in one definition
that coincides with the mathematical concept of weak-?-convergence:
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Definition 1.1 (Weak-?-convergence of probability measures). We say that a se-
quence {pn} of probability measures on RN converges weak-? to a probability mea-
sure p if for all continuous functions f∫
RN
f (x)dpn(x) →
∫
RN
f (x)dp(x)
holds. We write this as pn
?
⇀ p. The function f is sometimes called a test function.
To see the correspondence to the two intuitive approaches sketched above, we can
consider f (x) as a utility function or (in the second case) as a function which is 1
if x1 ≤ x ≤ x2 and zero otherwise.
Finally, we recall the concept of continuity. The word “continuous” unfortunately
has two quite different meanings in the English language. Since this may lead to
some confusion in this article, we briefly explain the two concepts: First, contin-
uous means non-discrete. We have already used this notion when talking about
measures (or lotteries). As an example, think on a normal distribution in contrast
to a lottery with finitely many putcomes. Second, continuous means not discon-
tinuous. We say that a function F is continuous in this sense, if for all sequences
xn converging to x, we have F(xn) → F(x). This second type of continuity is
an important concept in every model. Roughly spoken, we want a model to be
continuously depending on its parameters, since parameters can usually only be
measured with a certain amount of precision. This is the case even in a mathe-
matically well-sounded area like physics, and even more so in behavioral decision
theory where the precision of experiments is obviously limited. We will discuss the
lack of continuity in PT in Section 3. Before that, we turn our attention to the first
variant of continuity and generalize PT to continuous (i.e., non-discrete) lotteries
which lays the foundation for applications in areas like portfolio optimization.
2 Prospect Theory for continuous probability distribution
We first need to see why there is a difficulty in extending Prospect Theory from
discrete to continuous situations. To this end we first consider the naive approach
to this problem where we define the PT utility of a continuous distribution p on R
by
P˜T (p) :=
∫
v(x)w(p(x)) dx, (1)
where v is the value function and w the weighting function.
Every functional that measures preferences has to satisfy a couple of natural con-
ditions which are usually tacitly assumed, one of them being that the utility is
invariant under changes of the coordinate system. (The behavior shouldn’t change
if we “relabel” the monetary units.) However, it is easy to see that the above ansatz
(1) does not satisfy this assumption: a rescaling leads to lower values of p and
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reason behind this problem is the nonlinearity of the weighting function and hence
cannot be circumvented by choosing “appropriate” weighting- or value functions.
Let us now try a more sophisticated approach based on an approximation method.
The key idea is to approximate the absolutely continuous probability measure p by
a sequence of Dirac measures pn. The usual PT utility for finitely many outcomes
can be computed for pn and we will study the limit limn→∞ PT (pn). The hope is to
find a limit functional that can be used to directly compute PT (p).
There are several problems that we have to overcome here: First, not every possible
approximation pn of p leads to the same limit. This is caused by the highly discon-
tinuous structure of the PT functional. However, we can select a “representative”
approximation by formalizing the editing phase as collecting of nearby outcomes.
Mathematically spoken, we decompose R into intervals of equal size 1/n. On each
interval we replace p by a Dirac measure of corresponding weight. More precisely,
we define
pz,n :=
∫ z+1
n
z
n
dp, p¯n :=
∑
z∈Z
pz,nδz/n.
The measures p¯n are still infinite sums of Diracs, but since p is a probability mea-
sure, it is easy to see that
∫
[z/n,(z+1)/n) dp → 0 for |z| → ∞, thus we can neglect
all, but finitely many intervals by making an arbitrarily small error. We call the
resulting measure pn. By a small lemma (see [9]), pn
?
⇀ p.
More general, we can use any decomposition of R into equally sized intervals
[xi, xi+1) where the size |xi − xi+1| → 0 and the union of these intervals covers
all of R as n → ∞. In fact, to keep the notation simpler, we will use this more
general class of approximations from now on.
At this point it is natural to ask why we have chosen the above approximation.
Here we can argue in two ways: first, it is the only homogenous approximation that
allows for over- and underweighting of the probability in the limit. By “homoge-
nous” we mean that the approximation does not depend in a crucial way on the
outcome. This means that the probability weighting of people does not explicitly
depend on the outcome involved. (This is, by the way, in contrast to Cumulative
Prospect Theory where only the most negative and most positive outcomes are
overweighted.)
The second motivation for our approach can be found in [5] where historical data
on stocks is used to derive an (approximate) lottery describing their performance
which is in turn used to derive subjective PT utilities. The most natural method of
forming a lottery is here again to integrate the (discrete) events into a histogram
that corresponds to a probability distribution. This approach is based on the un-
derstanding of the convergence properties of PT utilities in the limit of infinitely
many data points approximating an underlying probability distribution. The results
presented here provide this basis.
We can now study the limit of the resulting PT utilities and we will show the fol-
lowing (at first glance a little surprising) result:
62 PROSPECT THEORY FORCONTINUOUS PROBABILITYDISTRIBUTION
Theorem 2.1. Let p be a continuous probability distribution on R with expected
utility
EU(p) :=
∫
v(x)p(x) dx , 0
and let pn be defined as above. Assume v ∈ C1(R). Moreover, assume that for the
weighting function w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] there exists some α ∈ (0, 1] and some C > 0
such that
w(ε) = Cεα + O(ε2) (2)
for ε → 0. Then the PT utility
PT (pn) :=
∑
z
w(pn,z)v(z/n)
converges to
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) =
{ ∞, if α < 1,
C · EU(p), if α = 1,
Proof. Since p is absolute continuous, pi,n :=
∫ xi+1
xi
p(x) dx converges to zero as
n → ∞. Hence we can use the expression (2) to prove
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) = limn→∞
∑
i
w(pi,n)v(xi)
= lim
n→∞
∑
i
C(pi,n)αv(xi). (3)
In the case α = 1, we derive from this
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) = limn→∞
∑
i
C
(∫ xi+1
xi
v(ξ) dp +
∫ xi+1
xi
(v(xi) − v(ξ))p(x) dx
)
.
Since |v(xi)−v(ξ)| ≤ |v′(xi)||xi−ξ|+O(|xi−ξ|2) → 0 as n → ∞, for every converging
sequence of xi, we get
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) = C limn→∞
∑
i
∫ xi+1
xi
v(ξ)p(x) dx
= C · EU(p).
We now consider the case α < 1. From estimate (3) we obtain
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) = limn→∞
∑
i
C
pi,n
(pi,n)1−α
v(xi).
We estimate (pi,n)1−α ≤ (sn)1−α with sn := supi pi,n. Since pi,n → 0 as n → ∞, we
have sn → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore we arrive at
lim
n→∞ PT (pn) ≥ C limn→∞ s
α−1
n
∑
i
pi,nv(xi)
= C lim
n→∞ s
α−1
n EU(p),
which is infinite, since EU(p) , 0. 
7Remark 2.2. As we have seen, the condition EU(p) , 0 is only used in the case
α < 1. Since the expected utility is only meaningful up to an affine transformation,
this can be assumed without loss of generality.
Remark 2.3. The classical case studied by Kahneman and Tversky [13] is the case
of α < 1. A weighting function with α = 1 has been suggested in [10]. We could
also consider the case α > 1. Here the limit of PT (pn) as n → ∞ is zero. The
proof is similar to the above cases, but the result is less interesting, since this case
corresponds to an underweighting of low probabilities which is experimentally not
observed.
Theorem 2.1 highlights the difficulty of probability weighting in Prospect Theory;
in the approximation process, the single probabilities become smaller and smaller,
hence (if α < 1) the overweighting becomes stronger and stronger and finally leads
to an infinite utility. In the case α = 1, however, the relative difference between
the overweighing becomes smaller and smaller as the single probabilities become
small, hence in the limit the overweighting does not play a role anymore and we
arrive simply at a variant of the expected utility.
Both cases are of course useless: we need a finite limit functional that still reflects
the basic property of probability weighting. We therefore need to renormalize the
PT functional in order to avoid the infinite overweighting. This is reasonable also
from a modeling point of view: a person might overweight certain unlikely events,
however, it is somehow strange to think that a person will end up with a perceived
total probability larger than one. We might rather expect that an overweighting
of one event will always cause the underweighting of another event. Classical
Prospect Theory negates this idea, whereas Cumulative Prospect Theory always
has a total weighted probability of one. This difference does not matter much for
lotteries with only a couple of outcomes, but it becomes crucial in our approxima-
tion where the number of outcomes tends to infinity.
For these reasons we suggest the following normalization of the classical PT func-
tional that sets the sum of the weighted probabilities of PT to one:
NPT (p) :=
∑n
i=1 w(pi)v(xi)∑n
i=1 w(pi)
.
We will study some of the properties of this functional later. We will also show
that this normalized theory gives comparable results to the usual PT when applied
to data from classical lottery experiments. For the moment we want to demonstrate
that this new approach enables us to derive, using the above convergence method,
a variant of Prospect Theory for continuous probability distributions.
Theorem 2.4. Let p be a probability distribution on R with exponential decay
at infinity and let pn be defined as above. Assume that v ∈ C1(R) has at most
polynomial growth and that for the weighting function w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] there
exists some α ∈ (0, 1) and some C > 0 such that w(ε) = Cεα + O(ε2) for ε → 0.
82 PROSPECT THEORY FORCONTINUOUS PROBABILITYDISTRIBUTION
Then the normalized PT utility
NPT (pn) :=
∑
z w(pn,z)v(z/n)∑
z w(pn,z)
converges to
lim
n→∞NPT (pn) = PT (p) :=
∫
v(x)p(x)α dx∫
p(x)α
.
(We can call the limit PT (p), since Prospect Theory has previously been only de-
fined for discrete lotteries, but p is non-discrete, in fact absolutely continuous.)
Proof. The proof follows the same general ideas as the proof of Theorem 2.1. We
denote hn := |xi − xi+1|. (Remember that, since the decomposition is assumed to be
homogenous, hn does not depend on i.)
lim
n→∞NPT (pn) = limn→∞
∑
i w(pi,n)v(xi)∑n
i=1 w(pi,n)
= lim
n→∞
∑
iC(pi,n)αv(xi)∑
iC(pi,n)α
= lim
n→∞
hαn
∑
i
(∫ x
xi
xi+1p(x) dx
)α
v(xi)
hαn
∑
i
(∫ x
xi
xi+1p(x) dx
)α .
We see that we can now rescale the enumerator by hαn (contrary to Theorem 2.1),
since we have another integral expression in the denominator. In the next step, we
transform the integrals into averages of which we can finally take the limit n → ∞
(since p is continuous):
lim
n→∞NPT (pn) = limn→∞
∑
i
(> xi+1
xi
p(x) dx
)α
v(xi)∑
i
(> xi+1
xi
p(x) dx
)α
=
∫
v(x)p(x)α dx∫
p(x)α
.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.4. 
Remark 2.5. The assumption that p has exponential decay at infinity and that v
has at most polynomial growth is needed in order to ensure that
∫
p(x)α dx and∫
p(x)αv(x) dx both have finite values. (The assumption can be weakened, e.g.
to
∫
p(x)α dx < +∞ if v is bounded.) This problem is closely related to the St.-
Petersburg paradox that occurs in CPT and is interesting on its own. The curious
reader may compare this with the results in [10].
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Figure 1: Effective weighting function for lotteries with two outcomes of NPT
compared to the classical weighting function by Kahneman and Tversky [13]. Both
functions are displayed for α = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8.
It is surprising that this approach has not been used before. A reason for that
might be that at first glance there seems to be no rationale why the sum of the
overweighted probabilities should be one. The standard example is here a lottery
where two events with the small probability p show a stronger influence on a deci-
sion than one event with probability 2p. However, a closer look reveals that such
experiments do not contradict our approach since it is again only about the relative
overweighting of the two events of the former lottery comparing to the single event
of the latter. The remaining outcomes are not taken into account and we expect a
relative underweighting of them.
Another potential problem with the approach might be that the resulting continuous
functional seems to contradict a core ingredients on PT, namely the S-shape of
the weighting function. In fact, the probability density p(x) is only weighted as
p(x)α, so we have a strictly concave “probability weighting function” and no S-
shape. However, this is not really the case: the normalization ensures that large
proabilities are still underweighted. We can see this effect directly in the discrete
case of NPT:
Example 2.6. Let us chose the weighting function w in NPT as w(p) := pα (which
is the natural case as it corresponds to the weighting function we get in NPT for
continuous distributions). We consider the case of two lotteries. Then the NPT
subjective utility corresponds to the PT subjective utility for the S-shaped weighting
function
w(p) :=
pα
(pα + (1 − p)α) .
The proof of this is straightforward, hence we omit it here. We sketch the graph of
w in Fig. 1 and compare it with the standard weighting function by Kahneman and
Tversky [13]. The function w is, unlike the original suggestion of Kahneman and
Tversky, monotone increasing for all α > 0, compare [10].
At this point one might wonder why the (symmetric) shape of Fig. 1 does not
exclude an explanation of the classical Allais paradox (compare Table 1). It is
one of the features of PT that it is able to explain the decision process leading to
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Lottery A Probability 33% 66% 1%
NPT=227.4 Outcome 2500 ¤ 2400 ¤ 0 ¤
Lottery B Probability 100%
NPT=232.4 Outcome 2400 ¤
Lottery C Probability 33% 67%
NPT=90.5 Outcome 2500 ¤ 0 ¤
Lottery D Probability 34% 66%
NPT=89.7 Outcome 2400 ¤ 0 ¤
Table 1: In the Allais paradox, people typically prefer Lottery B over Lottery A and
Lottery C over Lottery D, thus violating the independence axiom. This is predicted
correctly by NPT.
the paradox, based on the violation of the independence axiom (the “independence
of irrelevant alternatives”). It is easy to see that PT with a symmetric weighting
function (i.e. w(p) = 1 − w(1 − p)) does not allow an explanation of the Allais
paradox. However, the “effective” weighting function of Fig. 1 is only valid for
two outcomes. In order to formulate the Allais paradox, we need at least three
different outcomes. In this case it is not possible to rewrite NPT as a variant of PT,
thus there is no “effective” weighting function. In fact, we can show that the Allais
paradox can still be explained with NPT: assume that w(p) = pα and v(x) = xβ
with α = β = 0.7, then a short computation gives the NPT-values shown in Table 1,
thus NPT predicts, like PT, the experimentally observed preferences.
In Section 4 we will test the classical experimental data by Kahneman and Tversky
[13] with NPT and the simple weighting function w(p) = pα.
3 Continuity in Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory lacks some properties which would be quite natural to assume.
In particular it violates stochastic dominance and is discontinuous. In the classical
framework of PT, there is therefore a process called “editing phase” which “filters”
such problems. The person is assumed to process first the presented lotteries, in
particular by collecting outcomes with identical (or nearly identical) values to a
single event. As an example for this editing process consider the following two
lotteries:
outcome 0¤ 9.99¤ 10¤
probability 0.8 0.1 0.1
outcome 0¤ 10¤
probability 0.8 0.2
Without an editing phase, PT could value the first higher than the second, due to the
strong overweighting of the low probability 0.1. In the editing phase, however, the
first lottery would be converted into a lottery similar to the second one, by simply
collecting the very similar payoffs of 9.99¤ and 10¤.
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In this example we see two effects of the editing phase: on the one hand, it avoids
stochastic dominance violation. (The second lottery is “obviously better”, i.e. it
is stochastically dominant.) On the other hand, it avoids a discontinuity of the
theory: a sequence pn of lotteries of the first type that converges to the second
lottery p does in PT (without editing phase) not satisfy the continuity condition
PT (pn) → PT (p).
In this section we present a modification of PT that incorporates this basic idea of
the editing phase. We will demonstrate that it is compatible with the normalized PT
introduced in the last section in that (after renormalization) its limit functional for
non-discrete probability distributions coincides with the limit functional of NPT.
At the end of this section we will then compare certain properties of this modified
version, called Smooth Prospect Theory (SPT), with PT and CPT to discuss its
usefulness.
Our idea is to model the editing phase by making our look on the payoffs a little
bit “fuzzy”. We introduce a parameter ε > 0 and assume that outcomes that differ
only by ε or less are more and more considered to be the same. In a first step
we therefore transform p :=
∑n
i=1 piδxi into an absolute continuous probability
distribution pε by the formula
pε(x) :=
n∑
i=1
piχ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x),
whenever χ[a,b](x) = 1 where a ≤ x ≤ b and χ[a,b](x) = 0 elsewhere. (χ[a,b] is called
the “characteristic function” of the interval [a, b].) In Fig. 2 we give an illustration
for such a transformation, based on a lottery similar to the one from our initial
example. (The idea is closely related to the concept of “kernel estimates” and to
“mollifiers” in analysis.)
p
x
ε
Figure 2: A lottery before (thick lines) and after (thin lines) the “editing phase” as
described by the SPT model.
Given this transformed probability, we now need to define its subjective utility in a
way that we recover the classical PT when ε → 0. To this aim, we need to define
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the Smooth Prospect Theory (SPT) of the lottery p by
S PTε(p) :=
∫
1
2ε
w
 n∑
i=1
piχ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x)
 v(x) dx (4)
(In the following, we will occasionally omit the index ε. Then ε is an arbitrary
fixed positive number.) We first prove that the above definition makes sense:
Proposition 3.1. Let S PTε(p) be given by (4). Then limε→0 S PTε(p) = PT (p).
Moreover, S PTε is invariant under affine rescaling.
Proof. If ε > 0 is smaller than mini, j |xi − x j|, then (4) simplifies to
S PTε(p) =
∫
1
2ε
n∑
i=1
w(pi)χ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x)v(x)
=
n∑
i=1
w(pi)
? xi+ε
xi−ε
v(x) dx.
Since v ∈ C1, we obtain limε→0 S PTε(p) = ∑ni=1 w(pi)v(xi).
A straightforward computation finally shows that S PT is invariant under affine
rescaling of the monetary units. 
The main purpose of incorporating the editing phase into the mathematical formal-
ism was to avoid the discontinuity of the original theory. The next theorem shows
that SPT is in fact continuous:
Theorem 3.2. Let pn and p be Dirac measures with pn
?
⇀ p, then S PT (pn) →
S PT (p), i.e., Smooth Prospect Theory is continuous.
Proof. First, we notice that (4) can be rewritten as follows:
S PTε(p) =
∫
1
2ε
w
 n∑
i=1
piχ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x)
 v(x) dx
=
∫
1
2ε
w
(∫ x+ε
x−ε
dp
)
v(x) dx. (5)
Using the definition of weak-? convergence and the test function χ[x−ε,x+ε] we
obtain for pn
?
⇀ p that ∫ x+ε
x−ε
dpn →
∫ x+ε
x−ε
dp.
Hence S PT (pn) → S PT (p). 
Remark 3.3. Although SPT is continuous, it can still violate the stochastic domi-
nance principle if ε > 0 is chosen small enough.
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In fact, one can show that for every fixed ε > 0, there can be lotteries violating
the stochastic dominance principle. Hence the “collecting” of similar outcomes by
itself is not a sufficient explanation for the avoidance of dominated lotteries. (The
proof of this is relatively easy, one just needs to construct a lottery with outcomes
being apart at least ε and so low probabilities that the overweighting still leads
to a stochastic dominance violation similar to the initial example.) However, the
number of stochastic dominance violations decreases, the larger the ε, the more.
We can now study the same limit for SPT that we have studied for normalized
PT in the previous section. Again, we first have to normalize the total subjective
probability to one. We write
S NPT (p) :=
∫
w
(∑n
i=1 piχ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x)
)
v(x) dx∫
w
(∑n
i=1 piχ[xi−ε,xi+ε](x)
)
dx
.
With this definition we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.4. Let p be a probability distribution on R with at least exponential
decay at infinity and let pn be probability measures with pn
?
⇀ p. Assume that
v ∈ C1(R) has at most polynomial growth and that for the weighting function
w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) and some C > 0 such that w(δ) =
Cδα + O(δ2) for δ → 0. Moreover, let εn → 0 as n → ∞. Then the SNPT utility of
pn converges to
lim
n→∞ S NPTεn(pn) = PT (p) =
∫
v(x)p(x)α dx∫
p(x)α
.
Proof. We use the representation (5) for the definition of S NPT and multiply de-
nominator and enumerator each by ε−αn to obtain
S NPT (pn) =
∫
ε−αn w
(∫ x+εn
x−εn dpn
)
v(x) dx∫
ε−αn w
(∫ x+εn
x−εn dpn
)
dx
.
Since εn → 0 as n → ∞, and the limit measure p is absolutely continuous, the
integrals
∫ x+εn
x−εn dpn converge to zero (uniformly in x). Using the growth of w near
zero, we obtain
lim
n→∞ S NPT (pn) = limn→∞
∫ (
ε−1n
∫ x+εn
x−εn dpn
)α
v(x) dx∫ (
ε−1n
∫ x+εn
x−εn dpn
)α
dx
.
Arguing like in the proof of Theorem 2.1 and using the weak-? convergence of pn,
this proves the convergence to PT (p). 
Remark 3.5. It is easy to verify that corresponding variants of Proposition 3.1,
Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.3 hold for SNPT as well.
In the following section we discuss the properties of the various variants of Prospect
Theory and compare them with experimental findings.
14 4 DESCRIPTIVE VALIDITY
Properties PT NPT SNPT CPT Empirical
Evidence
Violation of transitivity no no no no yes
Violation of internality yes no no no no
Example: when v(x)=x and w(.25)=.4,
the CE of (.25,100;.25,90;.25,.80;.25,0)
is 108, greater than any of the outcomes.
Violation of continuity yes yes no no
Violation of stochastic dominance yes yes yes no
Violation of independence axiom yes yes yes yes yes
Inverse S-shaped weighting function yes yes yes yes yes
which implies lower- and upper-subadditivity
Extreme outcomes receive more weights no no no yes yes
(rank-dependence)
Distinctive outcomes receive more weights yes yes yes no yes
(support theory)
Among distinctive outcomes, no no yes no
closer outcomes get less weights
Can be applied no yes yes yes
for continuous distribution
Table 2: Comparisons of Prospect Theory, Normalized Prospect Theory, Smooth
Normalized Prospect Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory,
4 Descriptive validity
Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory have been accepted as the most
competitive alternative theories of Expect Utility Theory to describe decision under
risks. Although CPT is often considered to have mathematically more elegant
properties, empirical evidence sometimes suggest that the original PT may capture
certain psychological processes that cannot be predicted by CPT. Unfortunately,
the application of PT is only limited to discrete distributions, which motivated us to
propose a slight modification, Normalized PT which can be extended to continuous
setting. The lack of continuity in the classical PT led us to another modification
that tries to include the editing phase or more specifically the aggregation of close
outcomes. The result is Smooth Prospect Theory that can again be normalized.
We compare several mathematical properties of PT, NPT, SNPT and CPT to the
empirical evidence, see Table 2, compare also [16]. It seems that NPT preserves
most of the properties of PT, except for the violation of internality, which is (viewed
from the experimental evidence) an undesirable property of PT. SNPT outperforms
PT and NPT in that it does not violate continuity and predicts that closer outcomes
are less overweighted than very distinct outcomes, which is psychologically very
plausible. Compared to other PT theories, the rank-dependent property of CPT is
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Gains PT NPT
parameter for
weighting function 0.68 0.59
parameter for
value function 0.83 0.66
goodness of fit 97.2% 97.6%
Losses PT NPT
parameter for
weighting function 0.71 0.94
parameter for
value function 0.64 0.77
goodness of fit 98.3% 98.3%
Table 3: Comparison of the average of the fitted parameters and the goodness of fit
between PT and NPT for gains (left) and losses (right).
more consistent with empirical evidence, however, it fails to predict that distinct
outcomes receive more weights than aggregated outcomes, which has been found
in experiments. In some applications, in particular in behavioral finance, an ad-
vantage of all variants of classical PT (thus also NPT and SNPT) is the reduced
computation load as compared to CPT, since an ordering of the probabilities by
their outcomes is not necessary.
After this qualitative comparison, we present the results of a quantitative analysis
of the NPT model. We reevaluate the classical data set by Tversky and Kahne-
man [13] and compare PT (with the value- and weighting functions as originally
suggested) with NPT where we choose the value function as in [13] and take the
natural weighting function w(p) := pα which we obtain in the limit of continuous
distributions. Both models have therefore two fitting parameters (in gains and in
losses each), however, the NPT model has no flexibility in choosing the weighting
function (besides adjusting the parameter α), whereas in PT the type of the func-
tion has to some extent been chosen in order to accommodate the experimental
data. We use a nonlinear regression with R2 as measurement of fit for each in-
dividual subject. Although our modification does not allow to chose the type of
weighting function, and does not have more fitting parameters, it fits the data at
least as good as the original PT model, compare Table 3.
It is not surprising that the new model leads to different results on the parameters.
– Even in the case of lotteries with only two outcomes where we can replace NPT
with a special variant of PT, as shown above, the “effective weighting function”
differs from the classical one, and so do the measured parameters. However, there
is a clear correlation between the PT and the NPT parameters, both for the weight-
ing function parameter and for the value function parameter, as can be seen from
Fig. 3.
In the data analysis, we noticed as an interesting side observation that NPT shows
the most advantage over PT for people who have a small weighting function pa-
rameter. In Fig. 4 we show the difference between the goodness of fit for both
models in percentage. An reason for this effect could be the irregular shape of the
classical weighting function by Tversky and Kahneman for small parameters. (The
function becomes even non-monotone for very small values, compare [10].)
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Figure 3: The correlation between the value (top) and weighting (bottom) param-
eters of PT and NPT for all test subjects. Data in gains is marked with a plus sign
(+), data in losses with a minus sign (−).
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Figure 4: Difference of goodness of fit (R2) between PT and NPT (a positive num-
ber indicates better fit of NPT) as a function of the weighting parameter in PT.
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5 Conclusions
We have suggested two extensions of Prospect Theory: Normalized Prospect The-
ory (NPT) and Smooth Normalized Prospect Theory (SNPT). NPT allows to handle
not only finite, but also infinite non-discrete lotteries. It shares the positive features
with PT and fits experimental data even slightly better than classical PT, although
it does not require more fitting parameters. One could argue that its weighting
function is more naturally chosen than in PT which makes the goodness of fit even
more remarkable. SNPT fixes the problem of continuity for PT in a natural way
that resembles the “editing phase” by Kahneman and Tversky [7]. This model also
eliminates many violations of stochastic dominance, although not all. Its limit for
non-discrete lotteries corresponds to the limit of NPT.
With these improvements over the classical Prospect Theory, we allow for applica-
tions (e.g. in finance) of original PT that seemed up to now only possible with the
conceptually different Cumulative Prospect Theory.
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